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STUDENT REPORT

PEOPLE'S WAR: A MODEL FOR INSURGENCY

MAJOR DAVID G. LUCAS   85-1655

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
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This paper Documents the five steps of the Instructional Systems Development (ISD) process used to research and write an article for the Squadron Officer School (SOS) Nonresident Program curriculum. The article summarizes and reviews Mao Tse-tung's theory of People's War. The ISD documentation, article, educational objectives, and sample test questions constitute a completely developed educational package.

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AUTHOR(S)   MAJOR DAVID G. LUCAS, USAF

FACULTY ADVISOR   MAJOR JAMES C. CLEM, ACSC/EDCJ

SPONSOR   MAJOR JULES S. THOMAS, SOS/EDCX

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AIR UNIVERSITY
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Squadron Officer School (SOS) is the first level in the Air Force's three-tier program of professional military education. The mission of SOS is "to provide for the professional development of company grade officers so they can better perform and value their roles in the conduct and support of combat operations and other Air Force missions." (6:20)

Conversations with the officer in charge of the SOS nonresident program led to the development of this project. The nonresident program director wanted to review one of the lessons on the adversary threat. This project was an effort to specifically identify what was desired, and then to develop an article, if necessary, written for that identified purpose. Because this article was for inclusion in the SOS nonresident course curriculum, the use of a methodology known as Instructional Systems Development (ISD) was required.

Air Force policy directs the use of the ISD process, which is merely "a systematic approach for developing instructional systems." (3:1-1) The first part of this project, Chapters One through Five, documents the five steps of the ISD process. These chapters detail the rationale behind the final product of the project, the article on Mao Tse-tung's theory of People's War. The ISD chapters will not be published. The article will be incorporated as a reading in Lesson 16 of the SOS nonresident course.

The author wishes to acknowledge the following individuals for the assistance they provided during the development of this project. These individuals are Dr. Donald D. Chipman, SOS/CAE, Major James C. Clem, ACSC/EDCJ, and Major Jules S. Thomas, SOS/EDCX.

iii

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Major David G. Lucas enlisted in the Air Force in June 1962. Following technical schools at Amarillo AFB, TX, and Keesler AFB, MS, he had a variety of assignments in the communications maintenance field. Tours of duty in Washington, Arkansas, Vietnam, Colorado, and Ramstein, Germany, led to his selection for the Airman's Education and Commissioning Program. He was commissioned in July 1973 from Officer Training School. Subsequent to graduation from Security Police training, he served at Plattsburgh AFB, NY, Erhac, Turkey, Sacramento, CA, and Gunter AFS, AL. Major Lucas has worked in a variety of Security Police positions including law enforcement, weapon systems security, operations officer, and Chief, Security Police. He has also held positions outside the Security Police field. Near the end of his assignment to Gunter AFS, he had the opportunity to serve as Base Deputy Commander.

In 1980, Major Lucas was selected for the faculty of Squadron Officer School (SOS), Maxwell AFB, AL. After a year as a Section Commander, he was chosen for a job in the Aerospace Division of the Curriculum Directorate. In that job, as a Force Employment Curriculum Manager, he was responsible for the large block of instruction dealing with the adversary threat. In addition, he delivered curriculum lectures to each SOS class on the topics of the Soviet Union and Maoist revolutionary warfare. Also, while serving at SOS, Major Lucas was a guest lecturer for a variety of groups in the Montgomery area. He spoke to ROTC students, reserve units of the Air Force and Navy, and at several Air University schools. He was also selected as an Air University Command Briefer.

Major Lucas received his Bachelor of Science Degree in Criminology from Florida State University in 1973. He is a graduate of SOS Class 79-C. Following graduation from Air Command and Staff College, Major Lucas will be assigned to the 27th Combat Support Group at Cannon AFB, NM, as the Commander, 27th Security Police Squadron.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Chapter One

DETERMINE THE LEARNING GOAL

INSTRUCTIONAL SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT (ISD) STEP ONE. The first step in the five step ISD model requires the developer of a new instructional period to determine precisely the requirements of the operational system. (3:2-1)

The first level of Professional Military Education available to Air Force officers is Squadron Officer School (SOS). The mission of SOS is "to provide for the professional development of company grade officers so they can better perform and value their roles in the conduct and support of combat operations and other Air Force missions." (6:28) To accomplish the mission, SOS offers both resident and nonresident (correspondence) courses.

To support the SOS mission, the curriculum is divided into four areas. In the nonresident course, Area IV, USAF and Force Employment, has the goal of helping students "know how US forces are employed in the international environment so they can more fully value their own contributions to national security objectives." (7:1) In this area of instruction, Lesson 16 deals with the adversary threat. The student's educational goal for Lesson 16 is to "know how international terrorism and guerrilla insurgency threaten our national security and how the United States can deal with this threat." (9:101) The present lesson includes two readings which concentrate on international terrorism, Soviet involvement in low intensity conflict, and the organization of US special operations forces.

The chief of the nonresident branch requested the author's assistance in reviewing Lesson 16 to determine if it needed revision. The branch had several reasons for conducting the review. The first of the reasons was that SOS policy charges the nonresident program to "parallel the resident course as closely as practical within the confines of educational methodology." (8:1) The resident course had seen several changes since the last revision of Lesson 16.

Many of the changes in the resident curriculum were given impetus with the advent of Project Warrior. USAF Chief of Staff General Lew Allen implemented Project Warrior in September 1982. General Allen believed that "a continuing study of military history, combat leadership, the principles of war, and particularly the application of airpower is necessary for us to meet the challenges that lie ahead." (4:1) Overall, Air Force leadership perceived that Air Force people were getting away from "warfighting as a state of mind and toward an eight to five business, managerial mindset."(1:56) In response, SOS added several new periods to the curriculum during the next two years. These additions focused on the goals of Project Warrior by examining conflict experiences. They were referred to as "military history" or "lessons learned" periods by the faculty. The periods covered topics such as strategic bombing in World War II, and air warfare in Korea, Vietnam, and the Falklands. The

curriculum phase covering the adversary threat added new periods on terrorism and insurgent strategy.

Following a content review of Lesson 16 and the corresponding periods from the resident course, the chief of the nonresident branch held a meeting with Dr. Don Chipman, the SOS educational advisor, and the author. The educational goal for the period addressed three areas: international terrorism, insurgency, and US responses. The two present readings, it was felt, did a good job of describing the essential elements of both international terrorism and the development of US responses. All agreed, however, that the lesson appeared to be weak in the "guerrilla insurgency" area. Some discussion then ensued over whether to reduce the scope of Lesson 16's educational goal. This could be done by dropping the reference to "guerrilla insurgency." But, since low intensity conflict is the most likely form of warfare in which the US will be involved, the participants felt it a necessity to cover the main ideas. The problem now was to develop or locate a short reading for this purpose.

The author next undertook a review of literature and a series of interviews on insurgent strategy. (11;12;16) Noticeable during this period of research was the constant referencing of Maoist theory. Virtually every article on insurgency or guerrilla warfare mentioned or alluded to Mao Tse-tung and his theory of People's War. And, since the chief of the nonresident program wanted a short article covering the theory of guerrilla insurgency, it began to appear an article on Mao might serve. This idea was validated in an interview with the Air Command and Staff College Chief of Asian Studies, Dr. Lawrence Grinter, who suggested SOS should use a short reading on Mao's theory of warfare. Dr. Grinter pointed out that Mao's ideas were aimed at rural settings which included most of the "third world," the area most prone to insurgent action. Additionally, he said, Mao's theory was unique in that it provided a consistent and fully developed plan of action. A strategy that began with revolutionary potential among the poor and evolved across the entire spectrum of conflict to include total war. (12) Mao's ideas, in other words, addressed all of the essential elements of "guerrilla insurgency."

For several reasons then, the nonresident program chief decided to retain Lesson 16's educational goal and supplement the curriculum materials with a reading on Mao's theory of war. The goal was determined to be valid because the US is most apt to engage in conflict at the low intensity levels of terrorism or insurgency. The students should, therefore, be familiar with the strategy most likely to be employed against them in the future. Additionally, in the third area of the educational goal, US responses and force organization are crucial factors in conflict management. The new article on Mao Tse-tung would provide a starting point for an individual's study of revolutionary war and a framework the officer could use in evaluating current insurgencies. This curriculum enhancement would also help to fulfill the goals of Project Warrior and bring the nonresident course into concert with the resident curriculum as required by SOS written policy. Therefore, the project goal was to provide an article for the SOS nonresident course which described the elements of Maoist theory and would fulfill the educational goal for Lesson 16.

Chapter Two

DETERMINE STUDENT KNOWLEDGE

ISD STEP TWO. ISD's second step involves determining what instruction is necessary. Here, an effort is made to discern the amount of knowledge about the subject already possessed by the target audience. (3:3-1)

The goal in this stage of ISD was to determine what knowledge about Mao's theory was already possessed by officers enrolled in the SOS nonresident program. Ideally, all officers would attend SOS in residence. However, due to many constraints, only about 50 percent actually are afforded the opportunity. The remaining officers must be satisfied with the correspondence course. Since approximately half the officer corps attends SOS in residence, it was assumed they were a representative sample of the knowledge level of the corps as a whole. With this assumption, the author used surveys of officers enrolled in the SOS residence course in this stage of the ISD analysis.

The SOS residence course includes a lecture on Maoist theory. Following each period of instruction, students are surveyed to determine their prior knowledge of the subject, the value and efficacy of instruction, and for any comments or criticisms they might offer. The student responses to the survey questions are summarized on AU Forms 722, "Student Reaction to Instruction." (5) Both prior knowledge of the subject and degree of knowledge increase are measured on a four-point scale. The scale ranges from 4.0 for considerable knowledge of the subject, 3.0 for a moderate amount of knowledge, 2.0 for a slight amount, to 1.0 for none.

An analysis was conducted of the resident student responses to the lecture on Maoist theory. From that analysis, the author was able to determine how much the students thought they knew about the subject before the lecture, and how much they thought they had gained from the instruction. For the lecture on Mao and his theory of Protracted War, students generally rated their knowledge before the lecture somewhere between slight and moderate. For example, Table 1 shows Class 84-B rated their prior knowledge at 2.53. Students in all four classes surveyed indicated their degree of knowledge increase as somewhere between moderate and considerable. Class 85-A, for example, rated the knowledge increase at 3.33. (5) These statistics indicated the students had obtained valuable information about this strategy.

While these figures provided a quantitative measure of student knowledge, another important source of information came from written student comments. (10) The author found that a large majority of the students felt not enough emphasis was given to the subject. Additional impetus for the project came from an interview with the chief of the SOS Standardization Division. This officer pointed out that fewer and fewer course officers had any combat experience. Indeed, according to the division's "SOS Professionalism Survey,"

3

only 4.5 percent of Class 85-A reported they had had any combat experience in Vietnam. (15) With the residence students acknowledging a lack of both knowledge and experience, the data indicated that SOS nonresident students would also benefit from exposure to this theory.

STUDENT REACTION TO INSTRUCTION (PROTRACTED WAR, PERIOD 2341) (5)		
CLASS	PRIOR KNOWLEDGE	DEGREE OF INCREASE
84-B	2.53	3.29
84-C	2.18	3.31
84-D	2.42	3.31
85-A	2.53	3.33

Table 1. Student Reaction to Instruction.

While it was apparent that students would benefit from the additional instruction, the nonresident program curriculum manager needed to limit the length of the reading. Because of printing restrictions on the length of the correspondence volumes, the article could be no more than ten pages long. This position was supported because the curriculum managers had found through surveys and interviews that shorter articles elicited the best responses from students.

Chapter Three

OBJECTIVES, SAMPLES OF BEHAVIOR, AND TEST QUESTIONS

ISD STEP THREE. In this step, specific objectives are developed for the instruction. These objectives are based on a comparison of the determined goal and what the students have been found to already know. The objectives are aimed at the differences between the two. Samples of behavior are designed and test questions are developed. (3:4-9)

In Chapter Two, the author found the average SOS student needed additional information on Maoist theory. While most students were familiar with the name and its relationship with revolutions, they lacked a general framework for use in analysis or productive discussion. Many students asked for additional information following the lecture. As an SOS faculty member for 4 years, the author participated in many seminar discussions on low intensity warfare. Most students were unable to impart knowledge or insight to their peers regarding revolutionary conflicts around the world. Rather, discussions tended to be disjointed stories of incidents and personal reactions to them. Following the lecture on Maoist theory, many students were able to analyze those same conflicts in terms of situations, strategies, and potential US alternatives. (14) The author's personal observations were validated by many of the student comments. (10)

The goal for Lesson 16 was studied and determined to be valid in Chapter One. Focusing the concept of "guerrilla insurgency," the chief of the nonresident program requested an article on Mao's theory of war. The article would explain the framework of Mao's strategy and provide the student a convenient guide for evaluation of revolutionary conflicts. Based on testing policy for the nonresident course, one objective, three samples of behavior, and a draft test question for each sample would be required in order to provide a complete lesson package.

The author developed the following objective and samples of behavior based on the results of Chapters One and Two. These guides will assist in focusing on the key information in the curriculum article.

OBJECTIVE: The students will know the basic elements of Mao Tse-tung's strategy of People's War.

SAMPLES OF BEHAVIOR: Each student should:

   -List the three essential principles of Maoist strategy.

   -Describe Mao's three stages of protracted war.

-State why Mao described the primary role of the People's Liberation Army

as more political than military.

Based upon conversations with the chief of the nonresident program, the SOS Educational Advisor, and the personal experience of the author, these objectives will satisfy the goal of Lesson 16. (11;14;16) Test questions were developed from the samples of behavior to measure student learning. The test questions are in an appendix at the end of the article.

Chapter Four

SELECT THE BEST TEACHING METHOD AND DEVELOP THE MATERIAL

ISD STEP FOUR. During this step, instructional procedures are selected and curriculum materials designed to help the students achieve the objectives. Trial runs of the instruction are made to validate effectiveness. (3:1-2)

The chief of the nonresident program branch had validated Lesson 16's educational goal, an analysis had determined student knowledge, and specific objectives and samples of behavior were developed by the author. The next important decision in the ISD process was to select the best teaching method.

Since the project was developed for the SOS nonresident course, this decision was very nearly predetermined. Of necessity, the instruction had to be in written form. And, given the printing constraints, a maximum of only ten pages could be allotted to the period. Although either a reading or a self-paced method could produce the knowledge level required, a programmed learning exercise would probably be of unacceptable length. Additionally, programmed learning modules demand "considerable development time and field testing," and are "among the most difficult, time-consuming, and costly to produce" of all the teaching methods. (2:18-7) The author possessed neither the time nor the expertise to undertake development of a self-paced lesson.

Instead, the author wrote an article for the nonresident course. This article was designed to specifically fulfill the educational objectives that had been developed. In fact, a reading was very appropriate for this lesson. Indeed, the Handbook for Air Force Instructors points out that a reading is "the most effective and time-efficient means of presenting knowledge-level material" for the majority of students. (2:18-6) The proposed reading is included as an appendix to this project.

Due to the time constraints of the ACSC program, long lead-times for printing, and the nature of a correspondence course, no trial run of this instructional period was conducted. However, the reading was reviewed by several experts on the SOS faculty including the present lecturer on Maoist theory. (11;13;16) Additionally, prior to their use, the proposed test questions will be thoroughly reviewed, and refined if necessary, by the SOS Test Item Review Committee.

The overall conclusion was that this reading would accomplish the objectives for which it was designed.

7

Chapter Five

EVALUATE THE MATERIAL

ISD STEP FIVE. This is the final step in the ISD process. The developed period of instruction is presented to the students, and they are tested to measure whether they achieved the desired educational goals and learning objectives. If testing fails to validate instruction, or if the system's goals change, instruction is modified as necessary. This integral feedback step is essential to the ISD process. (3:1-3)

The evaluation of the new reading's efficiency is, unfortunately, beyond the scope of this project. However, this evaluation will be routinely accomplished by the curriculum phase managers on the SOS faculty. They will have several sources of information for use in their analysis.

SOS nonresident curriculum managers receive a great deal of information regarding the performance of lessons in the course. They evaluate test results, student evaluations and comments for each lesson, and surveys of selected graduates. Test questions for Lesson 16 were specifically designed to evaluate the achievement of the learning objectives. As test results are obtained, the curriculum manager can study both demonstrated student knowledge and the performance of the test questions themselves. Additional feedback is available directly from the students. Each student evaluates the value and efficiency of each lesson's instruction. Comments and criticism are also solicited. Other, more general information, is available through routine surveys of selected graduates.

With all of this information, curriculum managers can, if necessary, make any needed changes. But, analysis and management of the period will be routine for the SOS faculty. They are trained for the job, and are accustomed to modifying instruction to meet changing curriculum objectives and to being responsive to student feedback.

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APPENDICES

PEOPLE'S WAR
A MODEL FOR INSURGENCY

A vast majority of the armed struggles since World War II have been low-intensity, revolutionary, or unconventional, wars. The United States, during this same period, has devoted a majority of its attention and resources preparing for the war the US hopes to deter. Certainly, it's correct for the main focus of US defense to center on nuclear and conventional forces appropriate for conflicts at the high end of the spectrum of conflict. Obviously, we must be prepared for such contingencies. At the same time, we must also prepare for other levels of confrontation where US interests are affected.

Because of the potentially cataclysmic results of a strategic nuclear war, it has remained a threat rather than a reality. Equally dangerous, a major conventional confrontation could quickly escalate. Since neither side is sure of just where the nuclear tripwire is located, and both want to avoid the dangers of uncontrolled escalation, neither seems likely to move at this level of conflict either. The probability is that if we are involved in a military conflict, it will be in the form of an unconventional or insurgent struggle. If US interests are to prevail, we must understand those conflicts.

Mao Tse-tung's essays offer a useful tool for analyzing many of these struggles. This review of revolutionary strategy is based primarily on the precepts of Mao Tse-tung who described his ideas in a series of essays between 1936 and 1938. (1) In those works, Mao outlined his strategy for winning control of China. He called it protracted, people's war. Mao was describing an open-ended conflict carried out through political and military operations designed to gain the allegiance of the people. To better understand this strategy, we must first understand how revolutionary, or unconventional, war differs from conventional strategy. Secondly, we must understand how revolutionary warfare is employed. Finally, we can ask what lessons or guides might be derived from a theory developed for a China of 50 years ago.

<u>PEOPLE'S WAR IS POLITICAL</u>

Until the 19th century, strategists and military commanders used unconventional warfare for supporting conventional operations by means of raids against enemy supply lines, sabotage, and operations with irregular forces in the enemy's rear areas. These capabilities are just as valuable today but the operations are only unconventional in their tactics. They are not what is described by the revolutionary strategist.

In the later 19th and especially in the 20th century, political ideas and goals were added to the military conceptions that had developed around unconventional operations. These ideas and goals centered on nationalism and a desire for economic and social improvement. Basically, revolutionary warfare

13

is a simultaneous political and military struggle by a "dispossessed" group for a radical change in the social system.

It's the political war that makes the revolutionary strategist different, rather than the mere use of unconventional tactics or guerrilla warfare. The revolutionary strategist concentrates his efforts on developing the active support of the people for the revolution. In the words of retired Major General Edward Lansdale, "(t)he adherence of the people is the prime objective of the war. Whichever side gains the allegiance of the people ends up not only with the people, but also with the land they live upon, their cities, their resources, and their country." (2) A simple approach to understanding how this type of strategy is employed is to review the case of Mao Tse-tung.

MAO AND HIS STRATEGY

THE SITUATION

China, in the early 1920s, was a vast, feudal empire. Roads were rudimentary and there was little communication between the provinces. Many of the provinces were controlled by regional warlords with their own armies. In those years there were two groups working to develop a central government to control China.

For a short time, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Kuomintang (KMT) worked together. By 1927, increasingly frustrated with each other, the communists and the Kuomintang split with the KMT prevailing. Mao Tse-tung, a member of the CCP who had worked among the peasants, had been impressed with the revolutionary potential among the impoverished peasant masses. With fewer than 1,000 armed fighters, he retreated into the mountains separating the remote southern provinces of Hunan and Kiangsi and set up a military base. He was soon joined by General Chu Teh. The two leaders combined their talents, Mao's political and Chu's military, and worked together to develop a new strategy.

Between 1928 and 1934, Mao and Chu organized an army soundly based on the support of the peasants in the Kiangsi mountains. They called it the People's Liberation Army (PLA). By 1931, the communists had established the Kiangsi Soviet and had begun to redistribute land among the poorer peasants. As their strength grew and the area under their control expanded, they attracted more and more attention from Chiang Kai-shek, now leader of the Kuomintang. (3)

While Mao worked among the southern peasants, Chiang expanded the central authority of the KMT and built a modern, professional army based upon the principles provided by his German military advisors. Beginning in 1930, Chiang responded to the communist challenge. He sent one offensive after another against the southern enclave. Called "extermination campaigns," the offensives were designed to annihilate Mao and his army and rid China of the communists. During the next 3 years, there were five campaigns launched against Mao's area. (4) During the first four, Chiang sent columns of troops from the surrounding provinces against the Kiangsi Soviet. The communists, even though they were outnumbered, used mobility and intelligence support

14

from the population to quickly concentrate all of their fighters against those columns, one at a time, and inflict disastrous losses on Chiang's forces. In response, Chiang Kai-shek changed his strategy and the fifth campaign began very differently.

In October, 1933, Chiang began to construct a ring of blockhouses and fortifications to completely surround the Kiangsi Soviet area. This was designed to cut communist mobility, supply lines, and intelligence. The encirclement was completed and became more effective as the KMT forces began to evacuate the people outside the fortified ring and away from communist influence. The communists were losing their most important source of recruits, information, and logistical support. They began to fight for every inch of ground as the tightening ring threatened their very existence. (5) This was positional warfare of the worst kind. Since Chiang had more troops than the communists, the KMT was likely to eventually win a war of attrition.

At this point, Mao had only two aims, survival of the PLA and the location of a new base area. To survive, Mao turned to a strategy of mobile warfare. In October of 1934, with about 100,000 troops, he broke out of the Kiangsi encirclement and began the celebrated retreat that came to be called the Long March. During the next 14 months, according to Mao, they marched across southern China and then north through the mountains to the remote province of Yenan, some 6,000 miles in all. Bombed and attacked nearly every day, they fought continual skirmishes with KMT troops or provincial warlords. They crossed 18 mountain ranges, 24 rivers, and occupied 62 cities and towns. (6) By the end of 1935, Mao and about 20,000 troops arrived in northern China.

Even though Yenan was very remote, Chiang Kai-shek was preparing for another offensive against Mao when the Japanese invaded China in 1937. Mao had been unable to militarily secure a base. Now he found a new way, a political way, to gain the security he needed. He formed a United Front with Chiang against the Japanese invaders. The Japanese did not have enough men to occupy all of China, and since he was now allied with the KMT, Mao was safe for a while in remote, northern China. (7)

The defeat in Kiangsi and the retreat to Yenan did two things for Mao Tse-tung: it catalyzed his thoughts on war and gave him time to fully formulate his strategy. The product of this period was a series of essays describing just how the communist PLA was going to "liberate" China. Organization, political activism, tactics, and strategy were blended together to form a comprehensive framework for total war. Maoist theory stated the PLA could frustrate and eventually overcome their militarily superior Japanese and KMT opponents.

THE THEORY

Mao's theory of People's War was based on three principles he considered essential for success in China. The first principle was to conduct the revolution from remote, rural areas. The next, was to use the PLA for prosecuting central roles in the revolution, and to have the army stress political action rather than military engagements. Finally, the third principle was the concept of "protracted struggle."

15

REMOTE RURAL AREAS. In accordance with his first principle, and with the vast majority of the population living in the countryside, Mao believed the fight had to be carried by the remote, rural villages, which would eventually encircle the cities. Only through mobilizing the peasant masses could the numerical superiority of the KMT and the Japanese be overcome. To build political programs and develop popular support is crucial to this type of strategy. But, to build support and develop a base area takes time. For this reason, Mao divided the countryside into three topographical types. He said the mountains were the most remote and, therefore, the best areas for revolutionary activity. After that came swamps and estuaries, and then the plains areas. (8) Within the base areas, the communist army would organize and mobilize the population to the revolutionary cause. The population was Mao's most important potential resource. So, the first principle of People's War was to begin in rural areas among the population and remote from government or enemy forces.

A POLITICIZED ARMY. Mao's second principle cast the People's Liberation Army for central roles in his strategy. Mao predicted it would be a long war, and he knew he would need a disciplined and organized command, control, and communications structure to coordinate the widespread conflict. With this in mind, he had integrated his political and military organizations and politicized the PLA. His emphasis on political activity over military engagements was related to his definition of power. Mao believed that with willpower, man, being a spiritual creation, could defeat weapons which were merely material. For example, in the strategic balance, we examine things like the numbers of weapons available, their technological sophistication, and the logistical support capabilities of the opposing forces. Those are important factors, but in Maoist terms, the analysis is far too narrow. Instead, the strategist must remember that it is man's willpower and morale that is decisive in war, not the quantity or quality of weapons. (9) So, since Mao's revolutionaries were both outnumbered and outgunned, the political role of motivating people to the communist cause had to take first priority.

In his analysis . Mao's theory, Samuel Griffith describes Mao's key to success as extensive political education concerning the issues for which the guerrillas were fighting. Cadre guerrilla leaders spent more time in organization, agitation, instruction, and propaganda work than they did in fighting. The result was a politically alert fighting man whose most important job was to win over the people. Thus, one of Mao's most famous analogies which described the guerrillas as being like fish, and the people the water in which the fish must swim. (10) Of course, the army would also have to fight, and in military action Mao advocated mobile warfare. The army's tactics would be those of the guerrilla. The PLA adopted four slogans which summarized those tactics:

1. When the enemy advances, we retreat!

2. When the enemy halts and encamps, we trouble them!

3. When the enemy seeks to avoid a battle, we attack!

4. When the enemy retreats, we pursue!(11)

16

Mao did not invent guerrilla tactics and they are neither complicated nor mysterious. In fact, they have been much the same throughout history. Indeed, as Walter LaQueur describes it, "typical guerrilla operations include harassment of the enemy, evasion of decisive battles, cutting lines of communications, carrying out surprise attacks. Guerrilla tactics are based on common sense and imagination." (12) Even though strategically outnumbered by as much as 10 to 1, Mao believed his guerrillas could maintain the offensive. They could capitalize on local support and intelligence gathered from the people and use their mobility to concentrate their fighters on small enemy detachments. In this way, a strategically inferior force could gain a 10 to 1 tactical advantage. (13)

A quick decision of annihilation was the operational principle for Mao's planning. The object of war was "to preserve oneself and destroy the enemy." (14) With these ideas in mind, Mao's forces always tried to concentrate a large force against a weaker enemy formation and quickly destroy it. Actions like that accomplished several purposes. First, they decreased enemy strength. They also added to guerrilla strength because the guerrillas could then scavenge the battlefield and recover the enemy's equipment and weapons. Mao felt if he could win just one victory a month "it would greatly demoralize the enemy, stimulate the morale of (his) own forces and evoke international support." (15)

The army, then, provided an organized structure for control and discipline and was to be used like a fisherman's net. The guerrilla commander could cast it wide over the people or draw it in tight. While dispersed widely, the PLA conducted its political work among the masses. When drawn in and concentrated, the army could conduct offensive operations and destroy enemy forces through quick decision battles. This would eventually weaken the enemy and build PLA strength.

THE THREE STAGES. The third essential principle in Mao's theory was to adopt a protracted strategy. Mao Tse-tung, in the late 1930s, was facing a desperate situation. He had just retreated 6,000 miles, and in the Japanese and KMT he had two enemies that were each far stronger than his own forces. Yet, analyzing the situation, he confidently decided he could not lose. His main lesson from the Kiangsi period was to avoid being pinned down. Thus, the fluidity of Mao's mobile, protracted war.

Mao wrote that China's war would pass through three orderly stages. Of course, these stages were not firm and exact delineations, a basis of Maoist theory is flexibility. But, they were useful in guiding the progress of the war. The PLA could move ahead a stage or drop back if the situation warranted. Indeed, because the war was spread so widely, CCP forces might be in Stage I in one theater of operations, and Stage II or III in another.

In his analysis of the war, based on the balance of forces and the situation in China, he foresaw the PLA as beginning from a weak position and therefore in Stage I, the strategic defensive. The enemy was strong and in their period of strategic offensive. During this stage, the weaker PLA forces were to avoid fighting for positions and adopt mobile warfare as their primary tactic. They would supplement their regular forces with guerrilla actions. The enemy's

17

expansion would lengthen his supply lines and make him more vulnerable to guerrilla activities. Thus, the primary concerns of revolutionary forces in this stage are to survive and to locate a secure base area remote from hostile forces.

Because China was so vast and the enemy had limited numbers of troops, they would eventually have to stop their expansion and try to safeguard their occupied areas. After the enemy expanded to his limit, the rear areas would be lightly garrisoned and could be exploited by guerrillas. This would be the period of the strategic stalemate, Stage II. The enemy would now be forced into a defensive strategy to protect the big cities and his lines of communications. He would be unable to wipe out the communist forces, but still too strong to attack frontally.

The primary tactic in Stage II is ruthless guerrilla warfare. During this stage, large numbers of PLA troops would be transferred to enemy rear areas. The guerrillas would then fiercely provoke their enemy with attacks in his occupied areas. This would keep the enemy reserve forces constantly on the move and more vulnerable to the ambushes and hit and run attacks of PLA mobile warfare. It could also provoke the opponent into overreacting and alienating the captured population. Mao wrote that Stage II would be the longest of the war, and would "be the most trying period but also the pivotal one." (16)

For the PLA to move ahead to Stage III, the strategic counter-offensive, three objectives had to be achieved. In the first objective, the CCP had to consolidate their control of the base areas. The base areas are the heart of Mao's strategy, and successful guerrilla operations depend on having a base in a friendly, cooperative peasant population. However, over time, with the loss of the cities and the hardships of the war, Mao knew there would be "vacillating elements." Those who would tire of the war and be willing to compromise on the goals of the communist revolution. Therefore, the masses in the base areas had to be "politically mobilized" and encouraged. The "vacillators" and pessimists were to be ruthlessly rooted out and swept away.

The second objective of Stage II was to expand guerrilla operations and weaken enemy morale. This effort was designed to create tremendous numbers of casualties and to drain the enemy's military and financial resources. (17) Finally, Stage II would be the longest of the war because the PLA couldn't go on the offensive until they'd achieved the third objective, a trained and equipped conventional army. Mao had begun with small, scattered guerrilla bands. In order to beat the conventional armies of his opponents he needed to transform some of those guerrillas into regular armies. He never refuted the power of guerrillas, and, in fact, felt both guerrilla and conventional forces were necessary for victory. Because he didn't feel the CCP could sufficiently equip conventional forces, Mao placed great emphasis on developing the support of international forces. He needed the intervention of outside forces to both degrade the strategic advantages of his opponents and to provide the resources necessary to create a regular army.

Should all of these objectives be achieved, the PLA could move to Stage III, the counter-offensive. The tactic of mobile warfare takes precedence in this stage with the guerrillas supporting the main battles and tying up reserves

18

with attacks in the rear areas. The revolution is converted into a civil war using conventional tactics.

Mao's theory, then, begins in remote rural areas among the people. The army is used as both a political and military instrument, and the revolutionaries adopt a long range view of the struggle. His employment of his strategy followed his theory to victory in 1949.

THE APPLICATION.

When he retreated to Yenan, Mao achieved his Stage I objectives of survival and securing a remote base area. Politically, he had the United Front with the KMT, and militarily, the PLA was beyond the reach of the Japanese. He was then ready to begin developing the three objectives of Stage II.

His first problem was to politically consolidate his new, northern base area, and that problem was complex. He had arrived in Yenan in 1935 with about 20,000 soldiers. These northern peasants had suffered greatly under corrupt regimes and brutal warlords. There was little reason to expect them to flock to a new armed group in their midst. Yet, by 1945, the CCP had 1,200,000 members and "controlled an area of 350,000 square miles with a population of 95 million, and had an army of 900,000 men and a militia force of 2,400,000." (18) There were two major factors that led to the rebirth of the CCP. First, the Japanese invasion had discredited the KMT by demonstrating it was unable to protect China. While Chiang and his army retreated before the Japanese, many of Mao's troops would stay in place and set up guerrilla operations. They were earning the respect of the peasants and selling themselves as the only true fighting patriots. (19) Another factor with contributed to communist success was the character of the Japanese occupation. Stern discipline over the Chinese peasants was combined with fierce offensive actions. For example, when the Japanese captured Nanking, 50,000 Japanese soldiers slaughtered 42,000 Chinese civilians. "Groups of men and women were lined up and machine-gunned or used alive for bayonet practice or tied up, doused with kerosene and set afire while officers looked on." (20) Atrocities like these drove many peasants into the communist areas. They were ripe for political and military organization.

When Mao arrived in Yenan, his first objective was to mobilize the peasants. To begin, he sent small units of political cadre to each village throughout the area. The cadre were to organize and mobilize the peasants to the communist cause, and they used Mao's approach. They began with a propaganda and indoctrination campaign using books, songs, posters, and simple plays. All of these devices included one basic theme, that the CCP was the party of patriotism and equality, and the only hope for the peasants. Teachers were included because a literacy campaign was fundamental to communist doctrine. Even small "children learned their first characters in the shape of simple revolutionary slogans, and then worked forward" into heroic stories of the communist army and the "promises of an earthly paradise in the soviet future." (21)

This propaganda was made more believable because Mao had insisted, from the very beginning, on justice and dignity for the peasant. Mao wrote that his

soldiers must share the life of the peasants. They must live in the villages and have no special favors. The PLA functioned under Mao's three rules of discipline and eight rules of conduct. (22) Basically, those guidelines required "respect for elders, leaving the local women alone, and paying for requisitioned food and material." (23)

Having begun by winning the trust of the peasants, the cadre next formed mass organizations. There were groups for the young, merchants, women, teachers, and farmers. These organizations broke down much of the old social structure and began to develop the concept of organized, communal projects and work. The farmers also received confiscated land and Mao's troops undertook civic action programs to help them with harvests, irrigation canals, and roads. (24) Of course, all these organizations were connected to the CCP through the cadre representatives. The party used the gathered information to identify "vacillators" and traitors to the revolution. And, if you weren't for the communist revolution, you were "swept away" by the home guard organization.

While Mao's organizational objective was underway, he also expanded his guerrilla operations. After training in the Yenan base area, newly recruited cadre were sent into the power vacuum in the Japanese occupied areas. There, the social structure had collapsed when the KMT was defeated and pushed to the west. Since the Japanese didn't have enough men to occupy and control the entire countryside, Mao saw great potential there for guerrilla exploitation. With Mao devoting 70 percent of his effort to expansion, by the Spring of 1945, many of the Japanese occupied provinces were under effective communist control. (25)

Mao's guerrillas were making progress in political and military operations, but he still needed that international event that would take away the strategic advantages of his opponents. That event occurred with the Japanese surrender in 1945. Mao's only rival left for control of China would be Chiang Kai-shek and the KMT. However, Mao was still unable to equip a conventional army and could not go on the offensive, Stage III, until he had one. The Soviet Army now came to Mao's assistance. When they destroyed the Japanese Army in Manchuria in 1945, the Russians captured huge stocks of Japanese arms. Including tanks, artillery, trucks, and weapons, this equipment was transferred to the PLA. (26) This gave Mao what was needed to equip an army and move to the offensive.

The last phase of the Chinese Civil War lasted from 1945 to 1949. Following the Japanese surrender, and with the aid of American transport and equipment, Chiang moved his best forces north to occupy the cities in industrial Manchuria. By 1948, his armies were encircled in the cities and tied down trying to protect their rail lines of communications. (27) Chiang's forces began to disintegrate and the communists began to push the KMT south. By 1949, the PLA had pushed the KMT right off the mainland of China to the island of Formosa, today known as Taiwan. The proof of Mao's strategy was his victory in China.

SUMMARY

Mao Tse-tung developed his strategy for a China of another age. Yet, in his writings, he provided a systematic analysis that can be applied to modern

20

revolutionary warfare. By calling his strategy People's War, he also emphasized the fact that the people and their support are the true objective in this type of struggle. Unconventional warfare is more than innovative use of weapons and tactics, it is politics by force of arms.

Mao's ideas provide a framework, or model, within which one can begin to rationalize the seeming chaos of the guerrilla attacks, sabotage, and terrorism that play such a large role in this kind of war. For example, several modern problems in political-military relationships are brought to mind even though the Chinese struggle is long past. The first of these problems involves the types of wars in which we're likely to become involved. The east-west competition is so pervasive in our world that many insurgencies will receive support (perhaps even direct assistance) from one side or the other. This will frequently attract support for the opponent. Military aid will undoubtedly be requested. But, the basis of these conflicts are drawn out battles of political will, for the minds of the people and control of the country. Aid, strategies, and tactics, must be designed with this political goal foremost.

Another problem, especially difficult for democratic nations to cope with, is the political use of United Front groups. Mao found it expedient to ally himself with his enemy until he became strong enough to destroy him. Since Lenin, trying to form front groups with genuine nationalist movements has been a primary tactic of communist revolutionaries. (28) It was used by Ho Chi Minh and Castro, and in Nicaragua and El Salvador. Trying to broaden their base and gain mass support, the revolutionaries plan to eventually outmaneuver the coopted, moderate elements in the United Front. This tactic was publicly documented with the release of captured papers from Maurice Bishop's New Jewel Movement in Grenada. Bishop was quoted as saying his government had "established a false, purely tactical alliance with bourgeois (moderate) elements" to reduce apprehension in the United States about a communist takeover. But, he said, those elements would not play a part in the revolution and would be "crushed" if they stepped out of line. (29)

A third difficulty that arises, for the United States in particular, is the very politicized nature of People's War. It is obvious, that both the political and the military struggles must be won. This requires the utmost in cooperation and coordination. As the old saying goes, "it does little good to dig a well in the afternoon, if you bomb the village all night." Mao found by combining his political and military organizations, he had a powerful tool for use in his strategy. The traditional separation of political and military affairs in the American military could put United States' efforts at a disadvantage in future conflicts.

Mao's theory provides an elegant model to aid in the study of insurgency. There are many others. Michael Howard, Oxford Professor of the History of War, offers three general rules for the military officer who wants to learn from history. To avoid being misled, and to develop guides for professional use he recommends the study be made in width, depth, and in context. The study must be wide ranging to understand how warfare has developed. Next, a single campaign should be deeply investigated. Not just from history and textbooks, but also from letters, memoirs, and diaries, "until the tidy outlines dissolve," and one can catch "a glimpse of the confusion and horror of the real experience." (30) Finally, the context of the campaign must be studied as well, because

21

wars are conflicts of societies. Sociological, political, and economic factors all contribute toward shaping the actual progress of the wars.

In America's future are more wars of limited means and limited objectives. Next time, military officers must be better prepared to participate in developing the appropriate strategies and tactics. They must base their participation on knowledge developed through professional study.

ENDNOTES

1. The seminal essays in which Mao presents his theory of People's War are: "Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War" (December 1936); "Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War Against Japan" (May 1938); "On Protracted War" (May 1938).

2. Edward G. Lansdale, "Peoples' Wars: Three Primary Lessons," Vital Speeches of the Day XXXIX (April 1, 1973): p. 357.

3. Edgar Snow, Red Star Over China, rev. and enl. ed., (New York: Grove Press, Inc. for Bantam Books, 1978), p. 67. Accounts of Mao's strength varied widely, ranging as high as 80 million people under communism. Mao found these estimates laughable and totaled his strength for Edgar Snow as approximately 9 million.

4. Snow, p. 175. Historians vary on how many campaigns were aimed at the communists during these years. In interviews with Snow in 1936, Red Army commanders listed five main campaigns and approximate numbers of KMT troops involved: 1) Dec 1930-Jan 1931, 100,000; 2) May-Jun 1931, 200,000; 3) Jul-Oct 1931, 300,000; 4) Apr-Oct 1933, 250,000; 5) Oct 1933-Oct 1934, 900,000.

5. Walter LaQueur, Guerrilla: A Historical and Critical Study, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1976), p. 247.

6. Snow, pp. 204-205.

7. David Rees, "Red Star in the East," War in Peace: Conventional and Guerrilla Warfare Since 1945, Sir Robert Thompson, ed., with an introduction by John Keegan (New York: Crown Publishers, 1982), p.3.

8. Mao Tse-tung, Six Essays on Military Affairs (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1972), p.163.

9. Ibid., p. 250.

10. Samuel B. Griffith, Mao Tse-tung on Guerrilla Warfare (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961): p. 8.

11. Snow, p. 168.

12. LaQueur, p. ix.

13. Mao, p. 103.

14. Ibid., p. 271.

15. Ibid., p. 278.

16. Ibid., p. 242.

17. Barbara W. Tuchman, Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 1911-45 (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1971): pp. 236-237. General Pai Ch'ung-hsi, in a conversation with General Joseph Stilwell, characterized the Chinese attitude toward casualties in the war with Japan. He believed China could afford to lose four men if Japan lost one. He added, that Chinese losses wouldn't be "significant" until they passed 50 million.

18. David Galula, Counter-Insurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964): pp. 34-35.

19. LaQueur, p. 241.

20. Tuchman, p. 225.

21. Snow, p. 242.

22. For the full text of the rules, see Snow, pp. 166-167.

23. Roger A. Beaumont, "Preventing Atrocity in Low-Intensity Conflict," Military Review (November 1983): p. 69.

24. Snow, p. 225.

25. LaQueur, p. 241.

26. Rees, p. 9.

27. Thomas G. Waller, Jr., "The Inferno of People's War," Air University Review (March-April 1984): p. 58.

28. Chalmers Johnson, Autopsy on People's War (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973): p. 12.

29. "Telling Papers," Montgomery Advertiser-Journal, 23 September 1984, p. 10A.

30. Michael Howard, "The Use and Abuse of Military History," Parameters: Journal of the US Army War College XI (1981), 1:14.

TEST QUESTIONS

AUTHOR'S NOTE

The following test questions were developed in support of the objectives in Chapter Three.

QUESTION ONE

OBJECTIVE AND SAMPLE: The students will know the basic elements of Mao Tse-tung's strategy of People's War.

-List the three essential principles of Maoist strategy.

TEST ITEM:

According to the article by Major Lucas, the three essential principles of Maoist strategy are to operate in remote, rural areas, to adopt a protracted strategy, and to

        a. use terror to intimidate the population.

        b. use a politicized army to arouse the people.

        c. develop external, or international, sources of supplies and equipment.

RATIONALE:

b is correct. Mao Tse-tung's second principle took note of the fact that he was outnumbered and so, had to politically recruit great masses of the peasantry.

QUESTION TWO

OBJECTIVE AND SAMPLE: The students will know the basic elements of Mao Tse-tung's strategy of People's War.

-Describe Mao's three stages of protracted war.

TEST ITEM:

According to the article by Major Lucas, Mao Tse-tung said his protracted strategy had three stages. He said when the revolutionaries are weak, they should avoid positional war and use mobile warfare. The revolutionaries must try to locate a remote base of operations and survive as a movement. This is a description of

a. Stage I, the Strategic Defensive.

b. Stage II, the Strategic Stalemate.

c. Stage III, the Strategic Counter-Offensive.

RATIONALE:

a is correct. It is during this first stage when the revolutionaries are most vulnerable and on the defensive.

27

QUESTION THREE

OBJECTIVE AND SAMPLE: The students will know the basic elements of Mao Tse-tung's strategy of People's War.

-State why Mao described the primary role of the People's Liberation Army as more political than military.

TEST ITEM:

According to the article by Major Lucas, Mao described the primary roles of the People's Liberation Army as

   a. secondary to the work of the party.

   b. more political than military, to recruit peasants for the revolution.

   c. first, a transport corps of military goods, then, a guerrilla force to harass the enemy, and finally, as disseminators of terror and propaganda.

RATIONALE:

b is correct. Mao emphasized the importance of popular support. The army's political role of motivating people to the communist cause had to take first priority.